

Experts & Multiplicative Weight Updates (MWU)

Warm up: The 2-action setting

There are n experts

On each day t the following happens:

- 1) Each expert i makes a prediction: Up/Down
- 2) The algorithm chooses Up or Down
- 3) The adversary reveals the actual outcome.
 - This outcome can depend on the alg's choice.

Define L_A to be the total "loss" for the algorithm, i.e., the # of mistakes.

Simplifying Assumption: Perfect Expert

↳ never makes a mistake

The Generalized Halving Algorithm

Divide time into "epochs"

In each epoch, run the Halving algorithm:

* keep track of Σ' , reset $\Sigma' \leftarrow \Sigma$
when Σ' gets empty starting a new epoch.

Analysis:

when we start on new epoch, all experts have made some mistake in the prev epoch. Thus:

$$L_* > \# \text{epochs} - 1.$$

On the other hand, in each epoch we make at most $\lceil \lg n \rceil$ mistakes as each mistake reduces Σ' by a factor of 2. Thus:

$$L_A \leq \# \text{epochs} \cdot \lg n$$

$$\leq (L_* + 1) \lg n. \quad \square$$

The Halving Algorithm

- Consider all experts Σ' with no mistakes so far
- Take the advice of majority in Σ' .

Every time we make a mistake the size of Σ' reduces by a factor of 2. Thus, $L_A \leq \lceil \lg n \rceil$.

No Perfect Expert

Let L_* be the total loss of the best expert.

Goal: Keep L_A close to L_* .

Lemma: There is an algorithm that guarantees

$$L_A \leq \lg n \cdot (L_* + 1).$$

Remark: There is an algorithm that guarantees

$$L_A \leq (2+\varepsilon) L_* + O\left(\frac{\lg n}{\varepsilon}\right).$$

Lemma: There is an adversary that guarantees $L_A \geq 2L_*$.

Pf: Let's say there are two experts "Up" & "Down".

The "Up" expert always predicts Up.

The "Down" expert always predicts Down.

Adversary:

W/e the alg chooses, adv chooses the opposite outcome.

After T days, $L_A = T$. But $L_* \leq \frac{T}{2}$. \square

The General Setting

Each expert has its own independent suggestion.
(Think of this as n actions to choose from.)

On each day t :

1. The algorithm chooses a distribution

$$p^t = (p_1^t, \dots, p_n^t) \text{ over the experts.}$$

* we follow expert i w.p. p_i^t .

2. The adversary, aware of p^t , reveals

the loss vector $\ell^t = (\ell_1^t, \dots, \ell_n^t)$

where $\ell_i^t \in [-1, +1]$ is the loss for expert i 's suggestion.

3. The expected loss of the algorithm is

$$\ell_A^t = \langle p^t, \ell^t \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^t \cdot \ell_i^t$$

Thm (MWU): For every $0 < \varepsilon \leq \frac{1}{2}$, there is an algorithm that guarantees

$$\ell_A \leq \ell_* + \varepsilon T + \frac{\lg n}{\varepsilon}.$$

If there is no gain, i.e., $\ell_i^t \in [0, 1]$ then

$$\ell_A \leq (1+\varepsilon) \ell_* + \frac{\lg n}{\varepsilon}.$$

The Multiplicative Weight Update Algorithm

MWU(ε):

* $w_i^1 \leftarrow 1$

* For $t=1 \dots T$:

- Follow expert i with prob $p_i^t = \frac{w_i^t}{\sum_{j=1}^n w_j^t}$
- After ℓ^t is revealed, we

* $\ell_A = \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_A^t$

* $\ell_* = \min_i \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_i^t$ expert i 's loss on day t

Suggestion 1: On day t , choose the advice of the best expert so far.

Adv: If the algorithm chooses expert i on day t ,

then let $\ell_i^t = 1$ & $\ell_j^t = -1$ for $j \neq i$.

$$\ell_A = T$$

$$\ell_* \leq \frac{T}{n} + (T - \frac{T}{n}) \times -1 = -T + \frac{2T}{n} = (\frac{2}{n} - 1)T$$

There is an expert that is the leader $\leq \frac{1}{n}$ times.

Call $\ell_A - \ell_*$ the "regret" of the algorithm.

We have low regret if it is $\circ(T)$.

Setting $\varepsilon = \sqrt{\frac{\lg n}{T}}$ we get $\sqrt{T \lg n} = \circ(T)$ regret.

$$\approx w_i^t (1 - \varepsilon \ell_i^t)$$

$$\xrightarrow{\text{set}} w_i^{t+1} \leftarrow w_i^t \cdot \exp(-\varepsilon \ell_i^t)$$